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Finance and Growth: Too Much of a Good Thing? 
 
Thorsten Beck1 
 
While theory does not predict an unambiguous relationship between finance and growth, over 
the past 20 years, economists have accumulated a substantial body of empirical evidence that 
financial sector deepening is a critical part of the economic development process. At the same 
time, the banking crisis literature has identified rapid credit growth as good predictor of 
systemic banking distress. Both findings are consistent with the theoretical literature, as the 
growth benefits of finance rely on maturity transformation and agency relationships, which 
makes it susceptible to fragility.  This is a very important point that is often ignored both by 
analysts and policy makers.  
 
The recent literature has also shown that finance can be pro-poor. Beyond cross-country 
evidence, country-level studies have shown that this relationship works mostly through labor 
market channels. By changing the structure of the economy and allowing more entry into the 
labor market of previously un- or underemployed segments of the population, finance helps 
reduce income inequality and poverty, but not by giving access to credit to everyone.2 This is 
also consistent with cross-country evidence that financial deepening is positively associated 
with employment growth in developing countries (Pagano and Pica, 2012). 
 
More recent research, however, has also pointed to important non-linear effects in the 
finance-growth relationship, which can only be partly explained by the inherent fragility of 
finance.  Aghion et al. (2005) show that the relationship turns insignificant at higher levels of 
economic development, while Arcand, Berkes and Panizza (2012) show that the relationship 
even turns negative at very high levels of financial development.  There also seems variation 
in the strength of the finance-growth relationship over time, with Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2011) showing that the relationship turned insignificant during the first decade of the 21st 
century.  
 
What are the reasons for this insignificant or even negative relationship between finance and 
growth across high-income countries?  Recent papers have put forward several explanations. 
In the following, I will focus on just two.  
 
Who gets the credit? 
One explanation focuses on the beneficiaries of the credit. While the theoretical and most of 
the empirical finance and growth literature has focused mostly on enterprise credit, financial 
systems in high-income countries provide a large share of their services, including credit, to 
households rather than enterprises. In several countries, household credit constitutes more 
than 80% of overall bank credit, including in Canada, Denmark, and the Netherlands, mostly 
mortgage credit. There has also been an increasing trend across high-income countries 
towards banks providing more credit to households rather than enterprises, driven partly by 
alternative financing sources for enterprises through financial markets, partly the higher cost 
efficiency with which banks have been able to provide consumer credit in recent times.  
Theory makes ambiguous predictions about the effects on the relationship between household 
credit and growth and initial empirical evidence shows an insignificant relationship between 
the two (Beck et al., 2012).  While there is a positive and significant relationship between 
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enterprise credit and GDP per capita growth, household credit enters insignificantly across 
different specifications, suggesting that variation in the extent to which banks provide credit 
to households cannot explain growth variation across countries.  Given the persistent increase 
in household credit in most high-income countries over the past 20 years, this might partly 
explain that the finance-growth relationship turns insignificant at high levels of economic 
development.  
 
Financial systems – size vs. services 
Another explanation posits that the financial system might actually grow too large relative to 
the real economy if it extracts excessively high informational rents and in this way attracts 
too much young talent towards the financial industry (Bolton et al., 2011; Philippon, 2010). 
Kneer (2013 a,b) provides empirical evidence for this hypothesis showing that industries 
relying more on human capital suffer more in their productivity as the financial system 
expands.  This hypothesis thus clearly points to a trade-off between the intermediation 
function a financial sector provides to the real economy and a drain on talent needed by the 
same real economy. Again, such a trade-off seems more likely at high levels of financial 
development than in countries with emerging financial markets.  
 
Related to this point is the question on the concept of the financial sector. While academics 
have focused mostly on the facilitating role of the financial sector, which consists of 
mobilizing funds for investment and contributing to an efficient allocation of capital in 
general, policy makers – especially before the crisis and more in some European countries 
than others - have often focused on financial services as a growth sector in itself.  This view 
towards the financial sector sees it more or less as an export sector, i.e. one that seeks to build 
an – often – nationally centered financial center stronghold by building on relative 
comparative advantages, such as skill base, favorable regulatory policies, subsidies, etc. The 
differences between these two approaches towards the financial sector can also be illustrated 
with different measures that are being used to capture the importance of the financial system. 
Academic economists typically focus on Private Credit to GDP, which is defined as the 
outstanding claims of financial institutions on the domestic non-financial private sector 
relative to economic activity as crude and imperfect measure of the development and 
efficiency of the financial system as it captures the intermediation function of financial 
institutions.  The financial center view, on the other hand, focuses on the financial sector’s 
contribution to GDP or the share of the labor force employed in the financial sector. 
 
Based on a sample of 77 countries for the period 1980-2007, Beck Degryse and Kneer (2014) 
find that intermediation activities increase growth and reduce volatility in the long run, while 
an expansion of the financial sectors along other dimensions has no long-run effect on real 
sector outcomes. Over shorter time horizons a large financial sector stimulates growth at the 
cost of higher volatility in high-income countries. While these results were obtained for the 
period before 2007, recent experiences - including the 2008 collapse of the Icelandic banking 
system and the collapse of the Cypriot banking system in 2012 - have confirmed the high risk 
of pursuing national financial centre strategies. 
 
What have we learned? 
First, the growth benefits of finance go hand in hand with its inherent fragility. Second, there 
are important non-linearities in the finance-growth relationship, with the relationship often 
insignificant in high-income countries, for reasons discussed above.  On the other extreme, in 
low-income countries, financial systems might be too small and too shallow to have any 
positive impact. On a broader level, these findings imply that the growth benefits of financial 
deepening come from finance, not financiers, from banking and not from banks.  While this 
might seem like an either trivial or very academic statement, it sends the strong message to 
policy makers that the focus should be on financial service provision more than about the 
interests of specific financial institutions or markets.  Similarly, the concerns of regulators 
should be about systemic stability and maintaining financial service provision for the real 
sector, more than about saving individual financial institutions.  This is also the idea behind 
the resolution and recovery plans, also known as living wills, to save parts of systemically 
important financial institutions that are critical for the functioning of the overall financial 
sector, shut down and liquidate non-critical parts and bail-in risk decision takers and junior 
claimants of the bank. 
 
A new research agenda 
What do these findings imply for the future research agenda? First, the non-linear relationship 
between finance and growth, with potential negative growth repercussions of over-sized 
financial systems raises the question of the optimal size of the financial system. Identifying 
the Goldilocks level of financial deepening – not too cold and not too hot – will be important. 
In recent work with different co-authors, I have tried to develop the concept of a financial 
depth frontier that indicates the constrained maximum sustainable size of the financial system 
in an economy, as a function of socio-economic and political traits and long-term institutional 
patterns. Such a concept also allows proper benchmarking of countries at different levels of 
income. Operationalizing the frontier concept with aggregate and micro-data to thus identify 
the location of a country’s financial system vis-a-vis the frontier and the most effective 
policies to close the gap to the frontier, push out the frontier or prevent the system from 
moving beyond the sustainable maximum will be important (Barajas et al., 2013; Beck and 
Feijen, 2013). In doing so, the literature might also make progress on reconciling the long-
term positive effects of finance with the negative short-term effects of rapid credit growth and 
thus bringing together the finance and growth with the banking crisis literature. 
 
Another important area of research should be the role of competition and rents. We know that 
financial service provision by banks is based on private information creation, which in turn 
implies rents for these institutions.  Competition has for a long time seen as undermining 
stability as it endangers banks’ franchise value and thus entices them to take aggressive risks.  
However, we also know that financial innovation that is critical for financial deepening 
depends on competition and there is sufficient evidence that competition can be good for 
financial deepening and financial inclusion.  Determining the right balance of competition 
and rents will be critical.  
 
Finally, the role of government requires more attention.  The relationship between finance, 
growth and fragility has always been influenced by government.  On the one hand, 
governments have a critical role in providing the key factors for financial deepening in a 
society, including macroeconomic stability and the contractual framework.  But is there a role 
for government beyond this in encouraging financial institutions and markets to grow and 
expand?  How much can the government help in filling market gaps?  An emerging literature 
has started to assess specific government interventions such as partial credit guarantee 
schemes, but a broader view is needed.  On the other hand, governments have taken on the 
role of regulating financial systems, though the question on the optimal design of financial 
safety nets and the balance between market and regulatory discipline remains.  Finally, 
governments face a conflict of interest to the extent that they are both arbiter over and user of 
financial services.  
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